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Abstract 
This paper explores the conditions under which authoritarian leaders 
engineer political business cycles. In addition to ballot stuffing and 
election violence, dictators hold manipulation of economic policy in their 
toolbox used to overwhelmingly win elections. I argue that dictators 
have a strong incentive to overspend before elections when they can 
credibly signal popularity via elections. In rigged elections where 
election results are almost predetermined, election results may not 
function well to demonstrate the dictators’ de facto popularity. When 
elections are less fraudulent, however, whether dictators will “win big” is 
uncertain. In such circumstances, autocrats are more inclined to 
manipulate policy instruments before elections, which in turn enable 
them to convey a credible signal of their ability to mobilize popular 
support. Cross-national statistical analysis covering 131 countries 
(1970-2008) uncovers two main findings. First, fiscal deficits in electoral 
years exist in authoritarian regimes, and their magnitude is larger than 
those in democracies. Second, among authoritarian regimes, autocrats 
with semi-competitive, less fraudulent elections are most likely to adopt 
expansionary fiscal policy prior to elections. There is an inverted U-
shaped relationship between election-year fiscal deficits and political 
regime types: In electoral authoritarianism, fiscal deficits tend to reach a 
peak; election-year fiscal imbalance tends to diminish as countries 
become either more democratic or more authoritarian. 
                                                        
* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2015 annual meetings of Southern Political 
Science Association and European Political Science Association, the “Growth, Crisis, Democracy” 
workshop, and Kobe University. I would like to thank all the participants in those conferences for 
their comments and feedback. I also wish to thank Faisal Ahmed, Marisa Kellam, Mary Stegmeyer, 
and Hiroyasu Uemura for their helpful feedback and suggestions on previous versions of this 
paper. This research project has been funded by a Waseda University Grant for Special Research 
Projects (Project number: 2015S-177)   
† Assistant Professor of Political Science in Institute for Advanced Study at Waseda University.  
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 2 
Introduction 
      Scholars have found ample evidence demonstrating that political leaders in democracies 
manipulate fiscal and monetary policies before competitive elections (Nordhous 1975, Tufte 
1978). Recent literature on authoritarian politics shows that some dictators also adopt 
expansionary economic policy prior to elections (e.g. Magaloni 2006; Pepinsky 2008; Blaydes 
2010). The similar findings of case studies from different regions suggest that autocrats generate 
political business cycles by utilizing a variety of policy instruments and raise the following 
questions: Do political business cycles generally exist in authoritarian regimes?3 If so, why do 
authoritarian leaders create electoral business cycles, given that they rarely lose elections? Do 
some types of authoritarian regimes create greater incentives to manipulate policy instruments 
than other types?  
In autocracies, where reliable political information is hard to obtain, potential opponents 
find it difficult to discern to what extent the dictator is popular. To signal his strength, the 
dictator uses elections in which he aims to score an overwhelming majority (Geddes 2006; 
Magaloni 2006; Simpser 2013). For this purpose, besides ballot stuffing and election violence, 
dictators use economic policy manipulation. Since semi-competitive, relatively fraud-free 
elections render more credible election results, I argue that dictators have a stronger incentive to 
                                                        
3 Throughout the paper, I use terms autocracies, dictatorships, authoritarianism, and non-
democracies interchangeably. By dictators and autocrats, I refer to top political leaders who hold 
de jure supreme authority in authoritarian regimes. I use the male pronoun to refer to 
authoritarian leaders, given the fact that, according to Archigos Version 2.9, 99.7 percent of 
political leaders in authoritarian regimes after World War II have been male.    
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 3 
adopt expansionary fiscal policy to overwhelmingly win in electoral authoritarian regimes than 
they do in closed authoritarian regimes.     
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, the paper explores empirically and 
theoretically the conditions under which governments overspend prior to elections. Building 
upon the signaling game framework in the study of political business cycles in democracies and 
recent discussion on the roles of elections in autocracies, I contend that political leaders in 
competitive authoritarian regimes are most inclined to manipulate economic policy before 
elections. Second, the paper also contributes to the burgeoning literatures of electoral fraud and 
authoritarian politics. It is well known that autocrats use various tools to win overwhelmingly at 
elections, yet we still know little about when they choose to rely more on one strategy over 
others from their “menu of manipulation” (Schedler 2002). Investigating how the magnitude of 
electoral business cycles changes depending on transparency of elections in authoritarian 
regimes, this paper explores the relationship between two primary tools available to dictators at 
the ballot box – electoral fraud and pre-electoral economic policy manipulation.  
In order to test my theoretical expectations, I employ a global dataset of fiscal surplus/deficits 
that covers 131 countries around the world during the period of 1970-2008. Cross-national 
statistical analysis confirms that fiscal deficits tend to increase in election years also in 
authoritarian regimes, which is consistent with existing single-case studies evidence on PBCs in 
authoritarianism. Perhaps surprisingly, my analysis suggests that authoritarian PBCs are larger 
than those in democracies, which has been the conventional research focus in the study of PBCs. I 
also find that fiscal deficits in election years tends to be most serious in autocracies with 
relatively fraud-free elections: autocrats seem to engineer political business cycles when they (1) 
hold semi-competitive elections in which they permit opposition parties and multiple candidates 
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2016-002 
 
 
 4 
and (2) commit less electoral fraud. Using the Polity IV score as an indicator of competitiveness, 
it turns out that fiscal balance in elections years follows a U-shaped function of political 
competitiveness: the size of political business cycles reaches a peak in autocracies with high 
political competition, it then tends to shrink as countries become either more authoritarian or 
more democratic. 
      The paper proceeds as follows. In next section, I review literature on political business cycles. 
The third section provides theoretical considerations on how and why political business cycles 
emerge in authoritarian regimes and derive testable implications. In the forth section, I test the 
hypotheses by conducting a cross-national statistical analysis. Lastly, conclusions follow to 
derive some policy implications from my analysis.   
 
Literature Review 
     Since the pioneering work by Nordhous (1975) and Tufte (1978), political scientists and 
economists have refined the theory of political business cycles (PBCs) and tested its implications 
by conducting a host of empirical analyses. The earliest model, assumed that voters decide whom 
to vote for based on the government’s pre-electoral economic performance. Assuming such 
voters, governing parties were thought to implement expansionary fiscal and monetary policies 
before elections to garner political support, resulting in real economic growth and increases in 
incomes. A large body of empirical studies using cross-national data from advanced democracies, 
however, did not find compelling evidence that governments achieve pre-electoral 
improvements in economic performance in the form of incomes, growth, and a temporal drop in 
unemployment rates (Lewis-Beck 1988; Alesina, Cohen and Roubini 1992; Drazen 2000, 238-
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239). Further, the assumption that voters myopically decide their voting behavior based on 
short-term, pre-electoral economic performance was too strong to be plausible.  
      Yet, another strand of empirical studies found that governments in advanced democracies 
manipulate economic policies before elections, leading to the exacerbation of election-year fiscal 
deficits and high inflation after elections (e.g. Nishizawa and Kohno 1989; Alesina, Cohen and 
Roubini 1992, Berger and Woitek 1997; Reid 1998). In other words, pre-electoral economic 
manipulation does not necessarily have a strong impact on real growth rates, but governments 
do tend to exercise expansionary fiscal policy during election years, resulting in fiscal imbalance 
and inflation. In providing a theoretical explanation to this puzzle, political economists 
introduced the idea of “information asymmetries” between voters and a government (Alesina 
1987; Rogoff and Silbert 1988; Rogoff 1990). Since voters are unable to gather information on 
the government’s de facto competence, they try to estimate it based on the government’s policy 
performance in the past and then decide whether to vote for the governing party or not. Knowing 
this, the governing party attempts to send a signal of their competence by manipulating 
economic policies before elections, leading to fiscal deficits and high inflation around election 
time.  
    This progress in the study on PBCs was largely built on data analyses using samples of 
advanced democracies. Applying the signaling game framework, more recent studies tend to 
shift their empirical focus to developing countries as well as new democracies. And, scholars 
conclude that governments in these countries are more prone to engineer electoral budget cycles 
than those in advanced democracies (Schuknecht 1996; Block, Ferree, and Singh 2003; Shi and 
Svensson 2006; Brender and Drazen 2005). Brender and Drazen (2005) and Shi and Svensson 
(2006) argue that this is due to a lack of political information in new democracies. It is more 
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difficult for voters in new democracies to get access to reliable, low-cost information on 
governments since voters are not accustomed to democratic party politics and also media are 
still underdeveloped. Therefore, as an alternative source of political information, voters are more 
inclined to estimate government competency by observing how extensively the government is 
able to boost up the economy prior to elections. Since the government recognizes this, it has a 
stronger incentive to adopt expansionary fiscal and monetary policy before elections to garner 
political support.  
     The previous studies on PBCs in democracies have assumed that party competition is so 
strong that elections may bring about government alternation. Brender and Drazen (2005, 6) 
contend that “if the political budget cycle reflects the manipulation of fiscal policy to improve an 
incumbents’ re-election chances, then it only makes sense in countries in which elections are 
competitive. If elections are not competitive, then the basic argument underlying the existence of 
a political business cycle loses much of its validity” (italics in original).  
Much research on authoritarian regimes, however, documents case study and region-specific 
evidence that autocrats also overspend prior to elections. Ames (1987) analyses 17 Latin 
American countries under military rule, finding election-year surges in government expenditures. 
Block (2002) demonstrates that governments manipulate fiscal and monetary policies at the eve 
of elections by using cross-national data from 44 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Krueger and 
Kuran (1993) find that the Turkish government tended to have created budget cycles under 
authoritarian rule (1950-1980). Grier and Grier (2000), Gonzalez (2000) and Magaloni (2006) all 
provide evidence that, under the rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party, the authoritarian 
government had loosened fiscal policy and devalued the currency to prepare for elections. In 
Russia, one of the typical competitive authoritarian regimes in the post-Cold War period, 
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Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) find that local politicians are more likely to create 
opportunistic PBCs in regions where media is not well institutionalized and civil liberty is 
underdeveloped. According to Blaydes (2011), the Mubarak regime tended to suffer high 
inflation rates and devalue the currency after elections. Pepinsky (2008), utilizing a quarterly 
time-series data from authoritarian Malaysia, shows that the authoritarian government tended 
to exacerbate fiscal discipline before elections. Conducting a time-series analysis by using 
monthly data from Kazakhstan, Higashijima (2010) shows that post-election inflation rates are 
more likely to surge when government revenues increase.  
    A panoply of evidence from authoritarian countries suggests that PBCs come about even in 
non-democratic settings where electoral competition is far from strong enough to bring electoral 
turnover. However, except for several works I will mention below, most previous studies focus 
on a single country or a specific region. This leads the extant literature to several shortcomings 
from a methodological point of view. Given that many case studies tend to focus on competitive 
authoritarian regimes (Egypt, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, and Russia) or dominant party systems 
(Mexico and Egypt) where governments allow limited electoral competition, their empirical 
findings may not extend to other authoritarian countries where electoral competition is more 
severely circumscribed. Further, although case studies enable us to derive useful insights, it is 
generally very difficult to control for country- or region-specific confounding factors, which may 
lead to serious omitted variables bias on their estimation results.        
     There are a few studies investigating electoral business cycles cross-nationally with a global 
sample. Including 81 developed and developing countries (1975-1995), Shi and Svensson (2006) 
find that governments in developing countries tend to suffer budget deficits in election years. 
Because politician’s rents of remaining in power is high and the share of informed voters in the 
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electorate is low in the developing world, these authors argue that governments in developing 
countries are more inclined to manipulate fiscal policy before elections to signal their 
competence. Wright (2011) provides a first systematic analysis of PBCs in dictatorships. He 
argues that dictators with dominant parties tend to engage in overspending only around election 
time, whereas overspending does not diminish even in the long run if dictators are not armed 
with such party institutions because non-dominant party regimes cannot credibly promise policy 
concessions and future rents through an institutionalized party organization.     
     Although these cross-national analyses are far more extensive in terms of data coverage, there 
are still a few issues to be addressed. Emphasizing differences between developed and 
developing countries and writing prior to the recent rapid development of the authoritarian 
politics literature, Shi and Svensson (2006), on the one hand, do not answer important questions 
about authoritarian elections and economic policies, such as: Do autocratic governments tend to 
manipulate the economy before elections more or less than democratic governments? Under 
what types of authoritarian regimes are political leaders more likely to create PBCs? Building on 
the recent authoritarian politics literature, on the other hand, Wright (2011) finds that there are 
PBCs also in dictatorships and that the long-term effect of elections on fiscal deficits may change 
depending on the existence of dominant parties. While resonating with his argument that 
dictators in general also overspend before elections, I posit another theoretical framework 
focusing more on differences in autocratic elections leading dictators to different incentive 
structures for the pre-electoral use of economic policy instruments. Further, his empirical 
analysis does not compare PBCs in autocracies with those in democracies and thus does not 
assess to what extent authoritarian PBCs are sizable and meaningful, relative to both nascent and 
matured democracies.  
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In what follows, I seek to reconcile the gaps in the literature and provide an answer to these 
research questions. I make a first systematic attempt to compare democratic and authoritarian 
electoral business cycles by using a global dataset of elections and fiscal balance around the 
globe, while controlling for country, region and time-specific unobserved heterogeneities 
through employing appropriate econometric methods. Furthermore, I provide a theoretical 
consideration to specify the conditions of authoritarian elections, under which political leaders 
are more likely to engage in pre-electoral economic manipulation. To explain significant 
differences in the size of PBCs among different autocracies, my theory focuses on the relative 
transparency of elections in authoritarian regimes, instead of the party institutions that are 
featured in Wright’s account. I argue that more transparent, competitive elections encourage 
dictators to overspend around election time because such elections provide dictators with a 
chance to credibly show their strength through sizable economic distribution and thus a big 
election victory. This would be the opposite prediction of Shi and Svensson (2006), who argue 
that political transparency generally encourages the governments to refrain from election-time 
overspending.              
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
     Previous literature on authoritarian politics suggests that autocrats face a dilemma between 
coercion and transparency (Wintrobe 1998). Repression forces people to obey the dictator and 
decreases the likelihood that citizens voice their dissidence against the regime. Violence, 
however, discourages people from publicly expressing their true preferences. This makes it very 
difficult for the dictator to accurately know to what extent he is actually supported by citizens, 
undermining the efficiency of governance. Moreover, the more repressive authoritarian rule is, 
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the more susceptible bureaucrats and middlemen are to corruption, since these ruling elites do 
not need to be afraid of the media and other free flows of information that, if they were allowed 
to exist, would monitor and detect their corrupt behavior. Fearing the deprivation of properties, 
citizens have much less incentive to engage in economic activities, leading to inefficient 
economies (Wright 2008; Egorov et al. 2009). Some researchers also think that repression is a 
risky strategy to maintain authoritarian rule because it often sparks popular protests and 
encourages insurgency (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Wood 2000; Goodwin 2001).    
     Scholars contend that, in order to deal with this dilemma between tyrannical rule and 
efficiency of governance, authoritarian leaders utilize “democratic” political institutions such as 
parties, parliament, and elections. By founding a dominant party, dictators can institutionalize 
ruling elites’ career promotion, thereby enabling long-lasting power sharing between dictators 
and ruling elites (Magaloni 2008; Svolik 2012). Dominant party organizations also allow 
dictators to mobilize mass support by constructing well-developed patronage networks, which 
contribute to the efficiency of economic distribution (Geddes 2006; Brownlee 2007; Higashijima 
2015a). Allowing moderate opposition to gain some seats and excluding radical opposition, 
authoritarian leaders use the legislature to divide and conquer the opposition camp (Lust-Okar 
2005). The legislature also becomes a useful access point for political elites to enjoy privileges, 
various spoils and policy concessions made by the regimes (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007;  Lust-
Okar 2008; Blaydes 2011) and for citizens to receive political accommodations and material 
benefits via lawmakers in exchange for their support (Lust-Okar 2008).  
     By holding elections and winning elections with large margins, dictators can convey a signal 
of regime strength (Magaloni 2006; Geddes 2006; Simpser 2013). Scoring an overwhelming 
electoral victory, dictators can demonstrate that the regimes are invincible. By doing so, dictators 
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can prevent ruling elites from defecting from the regimes and opposition figures from mobilizing 
their supporters.  
In producing an overwhelming electoral victory, dictators can use various techniques of 
electoral fraud.  Electoral fraud is defined as a series of undemocratic measures that bias election 
results in favor of the political leader (Schedler 2002). In light of this broad definition, electoral 
fraud consists of following three subcomponents: (1) election violence, (2) election cheating, and 
(3) undemocratic restrictions on electoral law. Election violence is physical intimidation during 
elections exercised largely by incumbent parties (Straus and Taylor 2012; Hafner-Burton et al. 
2012). Governments intend to use electoral violence to make violent threats against opposition 
candidates and citizens, thereby undermining oppositions’ effective campaigns and decreasing 
turnout of opposition supporters. Electoral cheating allows dictators to affect the number of 
votes during campaign periods and election days with nonviolent but still illegal measures such 
as undermining of oppositions’ freedom to campaigns, media bias, ballot stuffing, vote-buying, 
nonviolent intimidation, and so on (Kelley 2012). Restrictions on electoral law refers to a series 
of regulations that prevent citizens and electoral candidates from influencing politics, including 
limits on voting rights by certain social characteristics like gender and ethnicity, flaws in the 
complaints procedures, high thresholds for new parties to get registered and gain seats, 
constraints on the right to run for office such as language and educational requirements and so 
on (Kelley 2012).  
     Although facilitating an overwhelming victory, electoral fraud brings serious problems to 
dictators. Excessive violence and fraud sometimes fuel people’s discontent and provides 
opposition elites with chances to mobilize their supporters to take to the streets, which may 
threaten the regimes (Tucker 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2010; Higashijima 2015b). In addition, 
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electoral fraud undermines the information-gathering function of authoritarian elections and 
thus election results can no longer provide reliable information to know the distribution of 
popular support (Donno 2013).  
     In order to reduce these costs of electoral manipulation yet still maintain their overwhelming 
majorities in parliament, authoritarian leaders may have incentives to strengthening economic 
distribution before elections, thereby trying to “win big” at elections through citizens’ voluntary 
support (Higashijima 2015a). As an election approaches, authoritarian leaders take advantage of 
state resources to conduct intensive electoral campaigns for the ruling party, mobilize citizens of 
various social classes and ethnic groups, and distribute economic favors and adopt expansionary 
fiscal policy by implementing tax exemption, strengthening public goods provision, increasing 
pensions and salaries among public servants, and giving bonuses (Mubarak’s Egypt in Blaydes 
2010; Nazarbaev’s Kazakhstan in Higashijima 2015a). As a result, governments increase public 
expenditures, decrease revenues, and thus exacerbate fiscal balance in election years.  
      Among authoritarian regimes, I argue that autocrats with semi-competitive, relatively fraud-
free elections are most likely to manipulate the economy before elections. Authoritarian regimes 
are diverse and can be classified by various subtypes (O’Donnell 1973; Linz 1975; Geddes 1999; 
Gandhi 2008; Schedler et al. 2006; Levitsky and Way 2010). Considering “varieties of 
dictatorship” in light of types of authoritarian elections, most modern dictatorships hold national 
elections periodically, except for several outliers such as China, Saudi Arabia and Eritrea (Hyde 
2011). Yet, there is wide variation in the degree to which elections are competitive and 
fraudulent (Hyde and Marinov 2012). While some countries hold uncompetitive elections in 
which governments do not allow either opposition parties or multiple candidates (“closed 
authoritarianism”), others call semi-competitive elections to the extent that opposition parties 
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are legal and able to put their candidates in electoral districts and indeed enjoy some seats in 
parliament (“electoral authoritarianism”).  
     These differences in the transparency of authoritarian elections influence to what extent 
autocrats manipulate economic policy instruments prior to elections. The key here is whether 
the ruling party’s overwhelming electoral victory will credibly demonstrate de facto regime 
strength or popularity among citizens. In closed authoritarian regimes, people know that they do 
not have relevant options at the ballot box other than the ruling party and thus elections are not 
competitive at all. Where it is obvious that the dictator can win big, elections do not convey a 
credible signal of regime popularity because election results are not an accurate reflection of the 
dictator’s ability to derive political support from people, even if he “wins” 100% of the vote. In 
other words, the signaling effect of elections should become smaller in the elections where there 
is no electoral competition guaranteed. Knowing this façade character of elections, authoritarian 
leaders may refrain from adopting expansionary fiscal policy. Consequently, we should observe 
smaller PBCs in closed authoritarian regimes.  
     In contrast, when elections are semi-competitive and/or relatively fraud-free like those under 
electoral authoritarianism, election results become informative, to the point that citizens can 
estimate whether dictators can score an overwhelming majority, not a slim victory, via elections. 
People should know that elections in electoral authoritarian regimes are not truly competitive 
and transparent. They recognize that authoritarian leaders resort to a variety of fraudulent 
measures to prevent opposition parties from winning elections and bias election results in favor 
of ruling parties, which make it almost impossible for elections to bring about government 
alternation. Yet, they may also recognize that the outcomes is still uncertain with regard to 
whether dictators can win big, scoring 80% or 90% of the vote in many electoral authoritarian 
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regimes. They know that opposition parties are allowed to join electoral processes and obtain 
some portion of seats in parliament. Authoritarian leaders, if they know citizens think this way, 
should believe that pre-electoral economic distribution and a subsequent large victory at 
elections will play a powerful signaling function to demonstrate the dictators’ mobilization 
power. Owning to the semi-competitive character of elections, election results in electoral 
authoritarian regimes may become credible in the sense that they inform people of whether 
dictators are strong enough to maintain supermajorities at elections. Thus, authoritarian rulers 
find it useful to manipulate fiscal policy prior to semi-transparent elections, leading to a larger 
scale of PBCs, compared to those in closed authoritarianism. 
     If the competitiveness of elections influences the size of PBCs surrounding authoritarian 
elections, then one might expect the size of PBCs to increase as a country becomes more 
democratic. However, once a country democratizes and consolidates democracy by 
institutionalizing effective checks and balances and developing viable media, political leaders 
tend to refrain from engineering electoral business cycles. Previous studies on PBCs in 
democracies offer two reasons for the absence of PBCs in matured democracies. First, in 
consolidated democracies, citizens can more accurately estimate the governments’ competence 
through various alternative channels of political information (Alt and Lassen 2006; Brender and 
Drazen 2006; Shi and Svensson 2006). The more matured a democracy is, the better its media 
are at informing citizens of the government’s policy performance. Also, democratic governments 
themselves, which are always pressured to increase political transparency, may legislate access 
to information and establish independent auditing authorities, which enable citizens to acquire 
relevant information on government performance. Second, in matured democracy, severe 
political competition and a real possibility of government alternation may urge the government 
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to delegate some economic policy initiatives to “third parties,” such as central bankers, which 
makes it difficult for the governments to manipulate the economy prior to elections freely for 
their own sake (Grzymala-Busse 2007; Keefer and Stasavage 2002; Bodea 2011; Bodea and 
Higashijima 2015). For these reasons, once reaching a peak in autocracies with semi-competitive 
elections, the size of PBCs may shrink as the country democratizes.   
  
Evidence 
Data and Methods 
     I test theoretical expectations by conducting cross-national statistical analysis using a global 
dataset of fiscal balance.  My dataset covers 131 countries around the world from 1970 to 2008, 
including about 3,300 country-years. Appendix A shows a list of countries included in the 
analysis and Appendix B shows descriptive statistics.  
     The dependent variable is fiscal deficits relative to GDP. Brender and Drazen (2005) and Hyde 
and O’Mahony (2011) publish their datasets of fiscal balance online, yet they cover only 
democratic countries or developing countries. Based on their datasets, I construct a more 
comprehensive dataset on fiscal surplus/deficits4 to cover as many authoritarian countries as 
possible by referring to various data sources such as International Financial Statistics, 
Government Financial Statistics, IMF Annual Country Report, OECD Statistics, EBRD Transitional 
Reports etc.  
                                                        
4 My dataset measures the central government’s fiscal revenues and expenditures. Fiscal balance 
is calculated by taking (fiscal revenue + grants)  – fiscal expenditure.  
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    The main independent variable is the occurrence of national elections. To identify election 
years, I use Hein Goeman’s Election Dates Dataset, Hyde and Marinov’s (2012) National Elections 
in Democracies and Autocracies (NELDA) and the author’s corrections.  The election variable is 
coded 1 if either a legislative or presidential election is held in the observation year, and 
otherwise 0.       
      First of all, in order to investigate whether authoritarian governments manipulate the 
economy before elections, I divide the full sample into two --- democratic and authoritarian 
countries --- by using Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland’s (2009) dichotomous measure of political 
regimes (CGV data, thereafter). A country is regarded as democratic if it satisfies all the following 
four conditions and otherwise authoritarian: (1) the executive is elected, (2) the legislature is 
elected, (3) there is more than one political party, and (4) an incumbent regime has lost power 
through elections. Their definition of democracy and autocracy is reasonable for my purpose of 
identifying authoritarian elections in which opposition parties rarely win elections. I examine 
whether the coefficient of the election variable has a negative impact on fiscal balance in the 
authoritarian regime sample while comparing the result with that of the democracy sample. 
      My theory also predicts that the size of PBCs is largest in autocracies with less-manipulated 
elections. In order to test this hypothesis, I measure electoral transparency in authoritarian 
regimes in the following two ways. First, Hyde and Marinov (2012) see elections as minimally 
competitive if there is ex ante uncertainty over election results. According to them, elections are 
competitive if (1) multiple parties are legal, (2) more than two candidates are allowed to stand in 
electoral districts, and (3) the opposition is allowed to participate in the election. If all the three 
conditions are satisfied, the election is regarded as competitive, otherwise noncompetitive. I 
make two election dummies – (i) competitive elections and (ii) non-competitive elections – 
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2016-002 
 
 
 17 
comparing the occurrence of each type of election, respectively, to non-election years. I regress 
fiscal balance on these election dummies and other controls in the autocracy sample, expecting 
that only competitive elections have a negative impact on fiscal balance. This operationalization 
corresponds to the conventional distinction between “electoral” and “closed” authoritarianism in 
cross-national studies (Brownlee 2009; Kinne and Marinov 2013; Donno 2014)      
     Second, Kelley’s (2012) Quality of Elections Dataset (QoE) measures to what extent each 
election is manipulated with an ordinal scale. It relies on “the State Department’s assessment of 
whether the election represents the will of the voters, is free and fair, or in other ways frankly 
endorses the outcome, based on the entire content of the State Department report.” (Kelley 2012, 
188) The variable assesses elections by three scales -- 0: unacceptable, 0.5: ambiguous, 1: 
acceptable. Using this measure, I create three dummy variables -- 1. clean elections, 2. mediocre 
elections, and 3. dirty elections, setting non-election years as the reference category.      
     Finally, my theory also expects that the size of PBCs reaches a peak in autocracies with semi-
competitive elections and then becomes smaller in closed autocracies and matured democracies. 
To test this expectation, I use Polity IV scores – the most prevalent measure of political 
competitiveness and other authority characteristics. According to the previous literature on 
PBCs in democracies, the magnitude of PBCs tends to become smaller in more mature 
democracies where information is rich and political transparency is well guaranteed (Shi and 
Svensson 2006; Brender and Drazen 2006; Alt and Lassen 2006). On the other hand, as I have 
hypothesized, political leaders may be also less willing to manipulate the economy prior to 
elections if their authoritarian regimes are highly illiberal and repressive, whereas semi-
competitive elections encourage authoritarian leaders to overspend. Therefore, in order to 
consider such non-linearity, I introduce a three-way interaction model between the Polity IV 
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score, its square, and the election variable. The three-way interaction model enables me to test 
whether the negative impact of elections on fiscal balance is largest in authoritarian countries 
with semi-competitive elections and whether it shrinks where elections are either more 
authoritarian or more democratic. Polity IV mainly focuses on (1) competitiveness and openness 
of executive recruitment, (2) strength of institutional constraints on the chief executive, and (3) 
competitiveness of political participation. It assesses political regimes in the world on a 21-point 
scale (-10 [most authoritarian] to 10 [most democratic]). Using the measure, I test whether fiscal 
balance in election years is a U-shaped function of the authority characteristics and 
competitiveness of political regimes.  
     Based on findings in previous studies, I introduce GDP per capita (one year lagged),5 GDP 
growth (one year lagged),6 trade openness (one year lagged),7 capital openness (one year 
lagged),8 oil-gas value per capita,9 population over 65,10 de facto exchange rate regimes,11 civil 
                                                        
5 GDP per capita comes from World Development Indicators (WDI).  
6 The growth data is taken from WDI.  
7 Trade openness is measured as the sum of imports and exports relative to GDP, taken from WDI.  
8 I use Chinn and Ito’s (2005) measure of capital openness.  
9 The oil-gas variable comes from Ross (2011).  
10 WDI.  
11 The adoption of fixed exchange rate regimes makes it difficult for governments to loosen 
monetary policy, which in turn influences fiscal deficits. To control for substantive impacts of 
various exchange rate regimes, I introduce dummies of de fact exchange rate regimes. Using 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), there are five dummy 
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war, international war,12 and the number of strikes (one year lagged)13 as control variables. I 
also include five regional dummies (Western Europe and North America, Eastern Europe, Latin 
America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia14) and half-decade dummies15 to take into account 
regional and time-specific unobserved heterogeneities that do not change over time.     
     I use Cross-Sectional Time-Series (CSTS) data and the unit of analysis is country-year. When 
using CSTS data, researchers typically estimate a model in which they combine a lagged 
dependent variable with fixed effects estimations. But, it is well known that this estimation 
method tends to bias estimators when the number of cross-sections (countries) is larger than 
that of time-series (Wooldridge 2002; Beck and Katz 2004). Further, when introducing 
interaction terms between elections and Polity IV, normal fixed effects models tend to lose 
efficiency of the estimators (Plumper and Troeger 2007). To cope with these problems and 
maintain the robustness of the results, I use the following two statistical models: (1) Country-
fixed effects model with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) and Prais-Winsten (PW) 
regressions and (2) System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators.  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
variables included in models setting pegged the exchange rate regime as the reference category: 
(1) Crawling peg, (2) managed floating, (3) free floating, (4) falling exchange rate regimes, and 
(5) dual exchange rate regimes.   
12 Both civil and international war variables code 1 if a country is under conflict, and 0 otherwise.   
13 This is taken from Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive.  
14 The reference category is the Middle East and North Africa.  
15 I include dummy variables for 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 
2000-2004, and 2005-2009. 1970-1974 is the reference category.  
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     Fixed effects models control for country-specific unobservable heterogeneities, which do not 
change over time. As there should be many country-specific idiosyncratic factors affecting fiscal 
balance in a country, employing country-fixed effects is crucial to avoid omitted variables bias. 
The PCSEs allow me to consider special correlations and heteroskedasticity, whereas Prais-
Winsten regressions are adopted to deal with autocorrelation without using a lagged dependent 
variable. In the second estimation method, the system GMM models deal with several 
shortcomings of the data, including the short time span for many countries in the sample, fixed 
individual effects, and potential heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation within countries 
(Roodman 2007). In the GMM regressions, I use only up to the second lag of the variables for the 
regression in levels, to reduce the number of instruments and the risk of over-fitting the data. 
Also, I report two standard specification tests: The Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions 
tests the overall validity of the instruments and failure to reject the null hypothesis gives support 
for the model, including the choice of endogenous variables. The Arellano–Bond test for AR (2) in 
first differences tests whether the residuals from the regression in differences is second order 
serially correlated and failure to reject the null hypothesis supports the model specification.  
 
Results 
 
[Table 1 about here]  
 
     Table 1 shows the results. In Models 1 and 2, I test whether fiscal deficits in election years are 
more serious than those in non-election years under authoritarian regimes in general, employing 
a fixed effects with PCSEs-PW model and a System GMM estimator, respectively. In both models, 
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the coefficient of the election variable is negative with 1% to 5% statistical significance levels. 
The results indicate that authoritarian elections tend to worsen fiscal balance by 0.55% (Model 1, 
fixed effects model with PCSEs and PW regression) to 0.58% (Model 2, system GMM model). It 
suggests that authoritarian rulers also strengthen economic distribution in election years to 
signal their strength.  
     Models 3 and 4 then test PBCs in democracies by limiting the sample to only democratic 
countries. The election variable is negative and statistically significant, indicating that PBCs are 
working also in democracies. Substantively, in election years, governments tend to spend more 
by 0.35% (Model 4, system GMM model) to 0.31% (Model 3, fixed effects model) in democratic 
countries. Importantly, both models indicate that fiscal deficits in election years are larger in the 
authoritarian regime sample than those in the democratic regime sample. Although we cannot 
directly compare those results from different samples, they also suggest that the magnitude of 
PBCs in authoritarian regimes may not be minor, but indeed more extensive than that in 
democratic countries on which researchers have focused.  
 
[Table 2 about here]  
 
     From Models 5 through 10, I estimate a handful of different models to examine what types of 
elections encourage governments to overspend. Models 5 and 6 introduce the competitive and 
façade election dummies to the authoritarian regime sample. The competitive elections dummy 
is negative and statistically significant in both models, suggesting that autocracies with 
competitive elections tend to exacerbate fiscal balance in election years by 0.682% (Model 5) to 
0.751% (Model 6) of GDP, as compared to non-election years. Façade elections, on the other 
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hand, do not have a statistically significant impact on fiscal deficits: the coefficient is negative but 
is not distinguishable from zero. The results suggest that elections, only in which there are 
multiple parties including opposition parties, encourage autocrats to overspend in election years.  
     Models 7 and 8 also look at transparency of elections, yet from a different angle. These models 
consider the extent to which authoritarian elections are relatively “free and fair” in terms of 
electoral fraud. I introduce the three election-quality dummies (clean elections, mediocre 
elections, and dirty elections) to the authoritarian regime sample. Consistent with the results 
above, clean elections tend to have a negative impact on fiscal balance in statistically significant 
ways in both models. Specifically, if elections are free from fraud, authoritarian governments 
tend to worsen fiscal balance by -0.9% to -1.15% of GDP in election years. Neither mediocre nor 
dirty elections, on the other hand, have a statistically significant impact on fiscal balance. These 
estimation results again suggest that, the more transparent and competitive elections are in 
authoritarian regimes, the more inclined autocrats are to manipulate fiscal policy before 
elections to win big.  
 
[Figure 1 about here]  
 
     Models 9 and 10 then introduce triple interaction terms including Polity IV, its square, and the 
election dummy. In both models, relevant interaction terms and the election variable are all 
statistically significant with expected signs. For the purpose of facilitating interpretation of the 
three-way interaction models, Figure 1 graphically illustrates changes in the coefficient of the 
election variable with 90% confidence intervals. The vertical axis represents fiscal balance 
relative to GDP, while the horizontal axis indicates the Polity IV scores. A vertical line is drawn at 
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the point where the Polity IV score is equal to 6, which is a conventional threshold adopted in 
previous work to distinguish democracies from autocracies. The figure shows that fiscal deficits 
in election years become the largest when the Polity IV score is around 2. From that point, the 
larger the Polity IV score is, the smaller the size of election-year fiscal deficits. When a country is 
a matured democracy (the Polity IV score is more than 7.8), the effect of elections is no longer 
distinguishable from 0 at the 10% statistical significance level. This part of the result is 
consistent with the findings in previous work showing that in matured democracies PBCs 
disappear (Brender and Drazen 2006; Shi and Svensson 2006). On the flip side, if the Polity IV 
score is less than 2, indicating a country that is more authoritarian, the magnitude of PBCs tends 
to shrink. Once the Polity IV score is less than around -4, we can no longer reject the null 
hypothesis with regards to the election year variable. The overall results support my theoretical 
expectations that the size of PBCs is the largest in autocracies with some level of political 
competitiveness, and then it becomes smaller in either more closed autocracies or more 
democratic countries.  
     Lastly, let us briefly look at the results of the control variables. Oil-gas value per capita is the 
only control variable that consistently has a positive, significant impact on fiscal balance. 
Controls such as GDP per capita, GDP growth, trade openness, capital openness, civil war and 
international war have the expected direction of coefficients but they are not statistically 
significant in a consistent way. On the other hand, the coefficients of population over 65, de facto 
exchange rate regimes, number of strikes are unstable across the models and statistically 
insignificant.  
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Conclusion 
     This paper has explored the conditions under which PBCs come about under authoritarian 
regimes. Using a global dataset of fiscal balance, The statistical analysis has demonstrated that 
PBCs do exist in authoritarian regimes and its magnitude is larger than those in democratic 
countries. Moreover, my analysis also demonstrates that the magnitude of PBCs tends to change 
depending on electoral transparency. More specifically, it turns out that fiscal deficits in election 
years are large when dictators hold semi-competitive, relatively free and fair elections. I also 
found that the magnitude of PBCs reaches a peak under the so-called electoral authoritarian 
regimes then shrinks as countries become either more authoritarian or more democratic. I 
interpret this series of results by emphasizing the signaling effect of authoritarian elections. In 
autocracies with relatively transparent elections, election results become sufficiently informative, 
such that the opposition and citizens more generally gauge regime strength by observing 
whether the governing party scores an overwhelming majority. The need to win big in a credible 
way incentivizes authoritarian governments to adopt expansionary fiscal policy to attract 
political support from citizens.  
     My analysis has shed light on one aspect of distributive politics under dictatorship, yet it also 
leads to some important implications for regime change in authoritarian countries. In electoral 
authoritarian regimes, dictators have to create strong electoral business cycles to sustain high 
levels of political support. This means, on one hand, that when authoritarian rulers are able to 
successfully distribute extensive economic favors to citizens, then authoritarian elections 
contribute to consolidating authoritarian rule. This signaling role of semi-competitive elections 
may mean, on the other hand, that if authoritarian leaders fail to create business cycles around 
election time, election results then may in turn credibly reveal the weakness of their current 
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regimes, thereby possibly leading to popular protests and leadership turnover. In fact, semi-
competitive elections in some countries have triggered leadership turnover and popular 
uprisings (Tucker 2007; Kuntz and Thompson 2009; Bunce and Wolchik 2010; Higashijima 
2015b).  
      If we consider this “double-edged sword” nature of semi-competitive elections and economic 
distribution in authoritarian regimes, we may better understand when international assistance 
for democratization will become more effective. First, international society may be able to more 
effectively urge electoral autocracies to democratize by limiting the economic resources that 
dictators can use through coercive diplomacy and international economic policy. For example, by 
reducing the amount of international remittances and foreign aid, we can put limits on financial 
resources available to dictators (cf. Ahmed 2012).  
      Second, international organizations may also promote democratization by forcing electoral 
autocrats not to rely on electoral fraud by strengthening international monitoring, thereby 
increasing the need for economic distribution. For instance, if the international community 
deploys election monitoring, dictators cannot rely much on electoral manipulation. Therefore, in 
order to garner more votes, they have to strengthen patronage distribution prior to elections 
(Hyde and O’Mahony 2011). As dictators in electoral authoritarianism have to create large 
electoral business cycles, such election monitoring will be more meaningful in electoral 
authoritarianism than closed authoritarianism to encourage regime change by putting serious 
pressures on dictators’ state coffers.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Political Business Cycles in Autocracies and Democracies 
 
Note: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
(a) F-value is reported. (b) regional dummies, country dummies (Models 1 and 3), and half decade dummies are 
included.  
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Table 2: Electoral Competitiveness and Political Business Cycles 
 
Note: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
(a) F-value is reported. (b) regional dummies and half decade dummies are included. 
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Figure 1: Competitive Elections and the Size of Political Business Cycles in Autocracies  
(Models 5 and 6) 
  
 
Figure 2: Electoral Fraud and the Size of PBCs in Autocracies  
(Models 7 and 8) 
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Figure 3: Political Competitiveness and the Size of PBCs (Model 7) 
 
Note: dashed lines are 90% confidence intervals.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A-1: List of Authoritarian Countries 
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Appendix A-2: List of Democratic Countries  
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics  
 
